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Abstract—In this paper, we propose a new averaging model
for modeling the competitive influence of K candidates among n
voters in an election process. For such an influence propagation
model, we address the question of how many seeded voters a
candidate needs to place among undecided voters in order to win
an election. We show that for a random network generated from
the stochastic block model, there exists a percolation threshold
for a candidate to win the election if the number of seeded voters
placed by the candidate exceeds the threshold. By conducting
extensive experiments, we show that our theoretical percolation
thresholds are very close to those obtained from simulations for
random networks and the errors are within 10% for a real-world
network.
Index Terms—competitive influence, percolation, stochastic
block model
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the advent of online social networks, such as
Twitter, Facebook, it becomes possible to spread the informa-
tion/misinformation to influence people in a short period of
time. Studying opinion dynamics to understand how opinions
are propagated through social networks is of importance
in social network analysis. In particular, Kempe, Kleinberg,
and Tardos [1] proposed two basic models for influence
propagation of a single idea (source, product) in a social
network: the Independent Cascade (IC) model and the Linear
Threshold (LT) model. In the IC model, a susceptible node is
activated through one of its neighboring node with a certain
influence probability. On the other hand, a susceptible node
in the LT model is activated if the sum of the influences of
its neighbors exceeds a certain threshold. Instead of focusing
on the propagation of a single idea in social networks, there
are various extensions of the IC model and the LT model for
multiple competing ideas (see, e.g., [2]–[11]).
Both the IC model and the LT model are exclusive in the
sense that an activated node will not change its state once
it is activated. Though such exclusive influence propagation
models might be suitable for modeling the purchase of a
product, it may not be appropriate for modeling an election
process, where the opinions of voters might change with
respect to time. As discussed in [12], there are several non-
exclusive models in the literature that could be used for
modeling an election process, including the averaging model
(the DeGroot model [13]), the bounded confidence model (the
HK model [14]), and the voter model [15], [16]. However,
these influence propagation models were originally designed
for positive influence (edge weights) only. Recent works in
[17], [18] showed that the influence could also be negative.
A negative influence (edge weight) between two neighboring
voters implies that these two voters might be from two hostile
camps and tend to adopt opposite opinions. Negative influence
poses a technical challenge for the analysis of opinion dynam-
ics as the opinions of voters might not be bounded and thus
need to be renormalized.
To tackle such a problem, in this paper we propose a new
averaging model for modeling the competitive influence of K
candidates among n voters in an election process. We assume
that each voter (in his/her mind) has a K-dimensional proba-
bility preference vector (PPV) that indicates the preference of
a voter on the K candidates. The opinion dynamic of a voter
then consists of two steps: (i) the combined influence on a
voter is computed by averaging over the weighted PPVs of
its neighbors, and (ii) the PPV of a voter is then updated and
renormalized by a softmax decision based on the combined
influence. For such a model, we pose the question of how
many seeded voters (voters who are stubborn and will not
change their mind) a candidate needs to place among unde-
cided voters in order to win over the votes from undecided
voters. We address such a question by analyzing our opinion
dynamic model in a random network generated from the
stochastic block model. Inspired by the percolation analysis
for the (single-idea) influence maximization problem in [19],
we show that (under certain technical conditions) there exists
a percolation threshold for a candidate to win the election if
the number of seeded voters placed by the candidate exceeds
the threshold. To the best of our knowledge, our percolation
results seem to be the first one in the competitive influence
maximization problem. By conducting extensive simulations,
we show that our theoretical percolation thresholds are very
close to those obtained from simulations. For the real-world
network, Political Blogs in [20], the errors are found to be less
than 10%. Additional experimental results for several real-
world networks, including the Youtube social network [21]
and the email network [22], [23], also show the percolation
phenomenon.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we introduce the system model, including the model for
competitive influence propagation model and the model for
the influence in a network. We then analyze our competitive
influence propagation model for random networks generated
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TABLE I
LIST OF NOTATIONS
Description
n The total number of voters (nodes)
K The total number of candidates
q(u,w) The influence from voter u to voter w
Q Q = (q(u,w)) the influence matrix
hu,k(t) The preference probability of voter u for candidate k
at time t
hu(t) The preference probability vector (PPV) of voter u at time t
hk The initial preference probability of an undecided voter
for candidate k
zu,k(t) The combined influence on voter u for candidate k at time t
Sk The set of seeded voters for candidate k
au,w The indicator variable for an edge between u and w
A A = (au,w) the adjacency matrix of a graph
m The total number of edges
β a parameter for modeling generalized modularity
b The total number of blocks in a SBM
kv The degree of node v
ρi The proportion of nodes in block i
pin The intra-block edge probability
pout The inter-block edge probability
Bk The set of (seeded) voters in block k (for candidate k)
Bb,k The set of seeded voters in block b for candidate k
ρb,k The fraction of nodes in Bb,k
Bub The set of undecided voters
ρub The fraction of undecided voters
λi the (normalized) degree of a node in block i in (11)
by the stochastic block models in Section III. Various exper-
iments are conducted in Section IV to verify the percolation
phenomenon in both random networks and several real-world
networks. The paper is then concluded in Section V, where
we discuss possible extensions of our work.
In Table I, we provide a list of notations that are used in
this paper.
II. THE SYSTEM MODEL
A. The model for competitive influence propagation
In this section, we introduce our competitive influence
propagation model for modeling an election process during
a period of time T . In our model, there are K candidates
Fig. 1. An illustration of our competitive influence model.
and n voters (see Figure 1 for an illustration). At any time
t, each voter has its own preferences on the K candidates
characterized by a probability vector. Specifically, let hu,k(t)
be the preference of voter u for candidate k at time t and
hu(t) = (hu,1(t), hu,2(t), . . . , hu,K(t)) be the preference
probability vector (PPV) of voter u at time t. In order for
hu(t) to be a probability vector, we need to ensure that
hu,k(t) ≥ 0 for all k and
∑K
k=1 hu,k(t) = 1. In addition
to these, we assume that there are two types of voters: seeded
voters and undecided voters. Seeded voters are stubborn and
their preferences will not be affected by other voters. Thus,
their preferences remain the same during the whole election
process. As such, the PPV of a seeded voter of candidate k is
fixed and set to be hu,k(t) = 1 and hu,`(t) = 0 for all ` 6= k
and all 0 ≤ t ≤ T . On the other hand, undecided voters’
preferences can be influenced by other voters. Moreover, the
initial PPVs of undecided voters are set according to a specific
probability vector h = (h1, h2, . . . , hK), i.e., hu,k(0) = hk,
k = 1, 2, . . . ,K, for an undecided voter u. The probability
vector h could be interpreted as an initial poll for the K
candidates at the beginning of the election process.
To model the influence between two voters, we let q(u,w)
be the influence from voter u to voter w. The n × n matrix
Q = (q(u,w)) is called the influence matrix in this paper.
The variable q(u,w) is assumed to be real-valued and it is
invariant with respect to time. We note that the influence could
be asymmetric, i.e., q(u,w) may not be the same as q(w, u).
To further model the propagation of the influence, we adopt
the widely used influence propagation model in the distributed
averaging system in [24] and the random gossip algorithm in
[25]. Specifically, each undecided voter has a clock which
ticks at the times of a Poisson process with rate 1. Once an
undecided voter’s clock ticks, it combines the influences from
all the other voters. For this, we let zu,k(t) be the combined
influence from the other voters on voter u for candidate k at
time t and it is computed as follows:
zu,k(t) =
∑
w 6=u
q(w, u)hw,k(t). (1)
When the clock of voter u ticks at time t, voter u first
computes the combined influence from the other voters for
all the K candidates and then makes a softmax decision [26],
[27] to update its preferences on the K candidates at time t+.
This is specified by the following update rule:
hu,k(t
+) =
eθzu,k(t)hu,k(t)∑K
`=1 e
θzu,`(t)hu,`(t)
, (2)
where θ > 0 is the inverse temperature that characterizes
how soft the decision is. Note that if θ → ∞, then the
decision becomes a hard decision, and hu,k(t+) = 1 if
k = argmax1≤`≤K zu,`(t) and 0 otherwise. At the ending
time T , each voter then votes for the candidate on whom
it has the highest preference, i.e., voter u votes for the
candidate k∗ if k∗ = argmax1≤`≤K hu,`(T ) (with ties broken
arbitrarily). In our model, one particular view of candidate K
is to interpret it as a virtual candidate, and undecided voters
voted for candidate K can be interpreted as undecided voters
who do not vote at time T . The details of our completive
influence propagation model are shown in Algorithm 1, where
we denote by Sk, k = 1, 2, . . . ,K, the set of seeded voters
selected by the K candidates.
Analogous to the influence maximization in [1], one can
also define the competitive influence maximization problem
for our model as the problem that asks each candidate to select
a set of seeded voters so as to maximize its expected number
of votes from undecided voters at the ending time T . Such a
problem is in general very difficult to solve for a deterministic
network. However, as we will show later that there exist very
interesting percolation results for random networks.
ALGORITHM 1: The competitive influence propagation
model
Input: The number of voters n, the number of
candidates K, the influence matrix
Q = (q(u,w)), the inverse temperature θ > 0, the
ending time T , the K seeded sets,
S1, S2, . . . , SK , and the initial PPV at time 0
h = (h1, h2, . . . , hK).
Output: The PPV of every voter at time T
hu(T ) = (hu,1(T ), hu,2(T ), . . . , hu,K(T )),
u = 1, 2, . . . , n.
(1) Initially, set the voters that are not in any seeded sets
as undecided voters and set its PPV by using the initial
PPV.
(2) Generate the clock of each undecided voter by a
Poisson process with rate 1.
(3) Suppose that the clock of an undecided voter ticks at
time t.
(4) Compute the combined influence on voter u for
candidate k at time t, i.e., zu,k(t), by using (1).
(5) Update the preference of voter u on candidate k at
time t+, i.e., hu,k(t+), by using (2).
(6) Repeat from Step 3 until the ending time T .
(7) For each voter u, find k(u) = argmax1≤`≤K hu,`(T )
and set hu,k(u)(T ) = 1 and hu,`(T ) = 0 for ` 6= k(u).
B. The model for influence in a network
For our competitive influence propagation model, we need a
model for the influence matrix Q = (q(u,w)). Though such
a matrix might be learned from a large dataset of cascades
that occurred in a social network (see, e.g., [28], [29]), it is in
general very difficult to learn a meaningful influence matrix
for a very large network. For our analysis for large networks,
we resort to mathematical models. In particular, we choose
the generalized modularity of an undirected graph [30] as our
model for influence. Consider an undirected graph G = (V,E)
with the n×n adjacency matrix A = (au,w), i.e., au,w = 1 if
there is an edge between node u and node w, and 0 otherwise.
Let m be the total number of edges in the undirected graph
and ku be the degree of node u in the graph. Then
m =
1
2
n∑
u=1
n∑
w=1
au,w, (3)
and
ku =
n∑
w=1
au,w. (4)
The generalized modularity of the graph G is defined as
q(u,w) =
au,w
2m
− β ku
2m
kw
2m
. (5)
If, furthermore, β is set to 1, then it reduced to the original
modularity defined in [31]. One intuitive interpretation of the
parameter β is to view β as an index for “social temperature.”
If β = 0, we note that q(u,w) > 0 if u and w are
connected by an edge. Thus, there are positive influence
between any pairs of two connected nodes. On the other hand,
if β = 1, then q(u,w) < 0 if u and w are not connected
by an edge. Thus, there are negative influence between any
pairs of two unconnected nodes. Increasing β increases the
“social temperature” and decreases “social cohesiveness” in a
network. For the community detection problem, it is well-
known (see, e.g., [30]) that the parameter β can be used
a “resolution” parameter to detect various time scales of
community structure in a network.
One possible generalization of our model for influence is
to use the generalized modularity of a sampled graph [32],
[33]. A sampled graph in [32], [33] is obtained by sampling a
graph G = (V,E) (with a set of nodes V and a set of edges
E) according to a specific bivariate distribution pU,W (u,w)
that characterizes the probability for the two nodes u and
w to appear in the same sample. The marginal distribution
PU (u) =
∑
w pU,W (u,w) is the probability that a node U is
sampled and it can be used for representing the centrality of
a node. The generalized modularity from node u to node w
in a sampled graph is defined as
q(u,w) = PU,W (u,w)− βPU (u)PW (w). (6)
There are many known methods to choose the bivariate
distribution pU,W (u,w). One commonly used method is the
uniform edge sampling, where U and W are the two ends
of a randomly selected edge. In this case, the generalized
modularity of a sampled graph in (6) recovers (5) as a special
case.
III. COMPETITIVE INFLUENCE PROPAGATION IN
STOCHASTIC BLOCK MODELS
In this section, we analyze our competitive influence propa-
gation model in random graphs generated by stochastic block
models.
A. Stochastic block models
We first give a brief introduction of the stochastic block
models. The stochastic block model is a generalization of the
Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graph [34] and it has been widely used
for generating random graphs that can be used for benchmark-
ing community detection algorithms (see, e.g., [35], [36]). In
a stochastic block model with n nodes and b blocks, the n
nodes are in general assumed to be evenly distributed to the b
blocks. Here we allow the number of nodes in the b blocks to
be different. For this, we let Bi be the set of nodes in the ith
block and ρi = |Bi|/n be the ratio of the number of nodes
in the ith block to the total number of nodes. Also, let
ρ = (ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρb) (7)
be the probability vector that a randomly selected node is
in block i, i = 1, 2, . . . , b. As in the construction of an
Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graph, the edges in a random graph
from the stochastic block model are generated independently.
Specifically, the probability that there is an edge between
two nodes within the same block is pin and the probability
that there is an edge between two nodes in two different
blocks is pout. For the ease of our presentation, we denote
by SBM(n, b, pin, pout, ρ) a random graph generated from the
stochastic block model with n nodes, b blocks, the intra-block
edge probability pin, the inter-block edge probability pout, and
nρi nodes in the ith block, i = 1, 2, . . . , b.
Now we consider the competitive influence propagation
model in a random graph generated from the stochastic block
model (see Figure 2). Suppose there are b− 1 candidates and
the nodes in Bk are all seeded voters (basic supporters) for
candidate k, k = 1, 2, . . . , b − 1. As such, undecided voters
only exist in block b. To attract the votes from block b, each
candidate then (randomly) selects a set of seeded voters in
block b. Specifically, let Bb,k be the set of seeded voters
selected by candidate k in block b and Bub = Bb\(∪b−1k=1Bb,k)
be the set of undecided voters in block b. Let ρb,k = |Bb,k|/n
be the ratio of the number of seeded voters in Bb,k, k =
1, 2, . . . , b−1, to the total number of voters, and ρub = |Bub |/n
Fig. 2. The competitive influence model in the stochastic block model
be the ratio of the number of undecided voters to the total
number of voters. Note that
ρub = ρb −
b−1∑
k=1
ρb,k. (8)
For each undecided voter u, we assume that its initial PPV
is h (as described in Algorithm 1), i.e., hu,k(0) = hk for
k = 1, 2, . . . , b − 1. On the other hand, for a seeded voter u
of candidate i, we set hu,k(0) = δi,k, k = 1, 2, . . . , b − 1,
where δi,k is the delta function that has value 1 if i = k and
0 otherwise. As mentioned before, seeded voters are stubborn
and will not change their PPVs with respect to time. Only
undecided voters can be influenced by the other voters.
B. Percolation threshold
In this section, we analyze the competitive influence propa-
gation model in a random graph generated from the stochastic
block model. We will show that if the number of seeded voters
placed by a candidate in the set of undecided voters exceeds
a certain threshold, then the candidate is going to win over
(almost) all the undecided votes.
In the following lemma, we first derive a mean field
approximation for the combined influence on an undecided
voter u at time t. The mathematical theory behind this mean
field approximation is the strong law of large numbers. Due to
space limitation, the proof of Lemma 1 is given in in Appendix
A.
Lemma 1: For k = 1, 2, . . . , b− 1, let
hk(t) =
1
nρub
∑
w∈Bub
hw,k(t) (9)
be the average preference of undecided voters for candidate k.
The combined influence on voter u at time t has the following
approximation:
nzu,k(t) ≈ 1∑b
`=1 ρ`λ`
(
ρkpout + ρb,kpin + ρ
u
b pinhk(t)
−β ρkλkλb + (ρb,k + ρ
u
bhk(t))(λb)
2∑b
`=1 ρ`λ`
)
, (10)
where
λk = ρkpin + (1− ρk)pout, k = 1, 2, . . . , b. (11)
It is interesting to see that the mean field approximation
in (10) for the combined influence is independent of u and
thus it is the same for all undecided voters. In some sense,
undecided voters are well “mixed” in random networks as
they are subject to the same combined influence. As such,
their preferences (opinions) are expected to be very close to
the average preferences (opinions).
In the following theorem, we present the main result of this
paper by showing the percolation phenomenon in the compet-
itive influence prorogation model. The proof of Theorem 2 is
given in Appendix B.
Theorem 2: Assume that
(i) the initial PPV is uniformly distributed, i.e., hk =
1/(b− 1), k = 1, 2, . . . , b− 1,
(ii) the mean field approximation for the combined in-
fluence on an undecided voter at time t in (10) hold,
and
(iii)
pin − β (λb)
2∑b
`=1 ρ`λ`
≥ 0. (12)
Let k∗ = argmax1≤k≤b−1 zk, where
zk = ρkpout + (ρb,k + ρ
u
bhk)pin
−β ρkλkλb + (ρb,k + ρ
u
bhk)(λb)
2∑b
`=1 ρ`λ`
. (13)
Then for every undecided voter u, we have
hu,k∗(t) ≥ hu,k(t), (14)
zu,k∗(t) ≥ zu,k(t), and (15)
hu,k∗(t
+) ≥ hu,k∗(t), (16)
for all t and k 6= k∗.
Theorem 2 implies that if at time 0 all the undecided voters
have no particular preferences among the b−1 candidates and
candidate k∗ is the candidate that has the largest combined
influence on the undecided voters, then it remains the candi-
date that has the largest combined influence on the undecided
voters at any time t. Moreover, it is also the most preferred
candidate at any time t, and the preference of every undecided
voter for candidate k∗ is increasing in time. As such, candidate
k∗ is going to win over all the undecided votes at the ending
time T . The physical meaning of the assumption in (12) is
that the “average” influence between two undecided voters
is nonnegative. Through nonnegative influence prorogation,
candidate k∗ can receive higher preferences from undecided
voters with respect to time. We also note that the assumption
in (i) of Theorem 2 can be relaxed to the assumption that
candidate k∗ is the most preferred candidate at time 0, i.e.,
hk∗ ≥ hk for all k 6= k∗.
In view of Theorem 2, the strategy for candidate k to win
over all the undecided votes is to place nρb,k seeded voters
in the set of undecided voters so that zk in (13) is larger than
that of any other candidate. In other words, in order for a
candidate to win over undecided votes, it needs to keep placing
its seeded voters until the number of its seeded voters exceed
a percolation threshold. Note that the percolation threshold
depends on the numbers of seeded voters placed by the other
candidates, the network parameters pin and pout, and the
social temperature β.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we perform various experiments to verify the
performance and the percolation threshold of the competitive
influence propagation model in Algorithm 1 by using the
synthetic datasets generated from the stochastic block models
and a real-world network.
A. Stochastic block models
1) One eager candidate: In this experiment, we consider
the stochastic block model with n = 2000, b = 3, pin = 0.8,
pout = 0.2, ρ1 = 0.5, ρ2 = 0, ρ3 = 0.5, θ = 20. As such,
there are two candidates, i.e., K = b − 1 = 2. Candidate 1
is eager to win the election and it already has 1000 seeded
voters in block 1. On the other hand, candidate 2 does not
have any seeded voters. Undecided voters only exist in block
3. Suppose that candidate 1 would like to win over the votes
from undecided voters and places additional ρ3,1 · n (with
ρ3,1 ≤ ρ3 = 0.5) seeded voters in block 3. On the other hand,
candidate 2 places none of its seeded voters. As such,
ρub = ρ3 − ρ3,1 = 0.5− ρ3,1, (17)
and there are nρub undecided voters in block 3.
The question is then how many seeded voters candidate 1
need to place in block 3 in order to win over almost every
undecided voter. To address such a question, we apply our
percolation result in Theorem 2. Note that in this setting
λ1 = λ3 =
pin + pout
2
= 0.5,
λ2 = pout = 0.2.
Thus,
3∑
`=1
ρlλl = 0.5.
For the condition in (12) to hold, we need
pin − β (λb)
2∑b
`=1 ρ`λ`
= 0.8− β × 0.5 ≥ 0. (18)
The initial PPV for an undecided voter is set to be h =
(h1, h2) = (0.5, 0.5) as that there is no particular preference
for an undecided voter. Using (13), we can compute
z1 = 0.5× 0.2 + (ρ3,1 + (0.5− ρ3,1)× 0.5)× 0.8
−β 0.5× 0.5× 0.5 + (ρ3,1 + (0.5− ρ3,1)× 0.5)× (0.5)
2
0.5
,
z2 = (0.5− ρ3,1)× 0.5× 0.8
−β (0.5− ρ3,1)× 0.5)× (0.5)
2
0.5
. (19)
In order for z1 ≥ z2, candidate 1 needs to place ρ3,1 seeded
voters in block 3 with
ρ3,1 ≥ 1
2
β − 0.4
1.6− β . (20)
In Figure 3, we show the fraction of undecided voters who
vote for candidate 1 at T = 106 for β = 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, and 1.
The corresponding percolation thresholds for ρ3,1 are 0.167,
0.25, 0.357, and 0.5, respectively. As shown in Figure 3, these
percolation thresholds for ρ3,1 match extremely well with the
simulation results.
In Figure 4, We show the average preference of undecided
voters for candidate 1 over time, i.e., h1(t), with β = 0.7
for ρ3,1 = 0.05, 0.15, 0.25, 0.35, 0.45, respectively. Using (2)
and (10) yield theoretical results. Our theoretical results match
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Fig. 3. Percolation thresholds for one eager candidate
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Fig. 4. The average preference of undecided voters for candidate 1 over
time, with β = 0.7 for ρ3,1 = 0.05, 0.15, 0.25, 0.35, 0.45, respectively.
The theoretical results match extremely well with the simulation results.
extremely well with the simulation results. As shown in Figure
4, h1(t) increases to 1 if ρ3,1 exceeds the percolation threshold
0.167. Moreover, the larger ρ3,1 is, the faster the convergence
is. On the other hand, it decreases to 0 if ρ3,1 is below the
percolation threshold.
2) Two competing candidates: The simulation setting is
very similar to that in the previous section except that candi-
date 2 is also eager to win the election. To model this, we
set n = 3000, b = 4, ρ1 = ρ2 = ρ4 = 1/3, ρ3 = 0,
pin = 0.9, pout = 0.1, β = 0.8, θ = 100. As such, there
are three candidates, i.e., K = b − 1 = 3. Candidate 1 and
candidate 2 are competing to win the election, each of these
two candidates already has 1000 seeded voters in block 1 and
block 2, respectively. On the other hand, we assume that the
new candidate (candidate 3) does not have any seeded voter.
Undecided voters only exist in block 4. Suppose that candidate
1 (resp. candidate 2) places additional ρ4,1 · n (resp. ρ4,2 · n)
(with ρ4,1 ≤ ρ4 = 1/3) seeded voters in block 4 and that
candidate 3 places none of its seeded voters in block 4. As
such,
ρub = ρ4 − ρ4,1 − ρ4,2 = 1/3− ρ4,1 − ρ4,2, (21)
and there are nρub undecided voters in block 4.
The question is then how many seeded voters candidate 1
(resp. candidate 2) need to place in block 4 in order to win
over almost every undecided voter. To address such a question,
we apply our percolation result in Theorem 2. Note that in
this setting
λ1 = λ2 = λ4 = 1/3× pin + 2/3× pout = 11/30,
λ3 = pout = 0.1.
Thus,
4∑
`=1
ρlλl = 11/30.
For the condition in (12) to hold, we need
pin − β (λb)
2∑b
`=1 ρ`λ`
= 0.9− β × 11
30
≥ 0. (22)
The initial PPV for an undecided voter is set to be h =
(h1, h2, h3) = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) as that there is no particular
preference for an undecided voter. Using (13), we can com-
pute
z1 =
1
3
× 0.1 + (ρ4,1 + (1
3
− ρ4,1 − ρ4,2)× 1
3
)× 0.9
−β
1
3 × 1130
2
+ (ρ4,1 + (
1
3 − ρ4,1 − ρ4,2)× 13 )× 1130
2
11
30
,
z2 =
1
3
× 0.1 + (ρ4,2 + (1
3
− ρ4,1 − ρ4,2)× 1
3
)× 0.9
−β
1
3 × 1130
2
+ (ρ4,2 + (
1
3 − ρ4,1 − ρ4,2)× 13 )× 1130
2
11
30
,
z3 = (
1
3
− ρ4,1 − ρ4,2)× 1
3
× 0.9
−β (
1
3 − ρ4,1 − ρ4,2)× 13 × 1130
2
11
30
. (23)
In order for z1 ≥ z2 and z1 ≥ z3, candidate 1 needs to place
ρ4,1 seeded voters in block 3 with
ρ4,1 ≥ ρ4,2 ≥
33
270 × β − 130
0.9− 3390 × β
. (24)
In Figure 5, we show the fraction of undecided voters who
vote for these three candidates at T = 3×106 when β = 0.8.
We use different colors to depict the final voting results: red
for candidate 1, blue for candidate 2, and yellow for candidate
3. The darker the color of a candidate is, the larger fraction
of votes for that candidate is. Clearly, as shown in Figure 5,
there are percolation thresholds for a candidate to win over
the votes from undecided voters. For instance, if ρ4,1 > ρ4,2
and ρ4,1 > 0.106, then candidate 1 wins (almost) all the
votes from undecided voters. Once again, these percolation
Fig. 5. Percolation thresholds for two competing candidates
thresholds for ρ4,1 match extremely well with the simulation
results. On the other hand, if ρ4,2 > ρ4,1 and ρ4,2 > 0.106,
then candidate 2 wins (almost) all the votes from undecided
voters. When ρ4,1 < 0.106 and ρ4,2 < 0.106, candidate 3
wins (almost) all the votes from undecided voters. The reason
that candidate 3 can win all the votes from undecided voters
in that setting is that we choose β = 0.8 and the “social
temperature” is high. Undecided voters who do not have links
with seeded voters in blocks 1 and 2 tend to “dislike” these
two candidates, and thus decide not to vote for them.
B. Real-world network
1) The network of Political Blogs: In this experiment,
we evaluate our model on the real-world network (Political
Blogs) in [20] that is obtained from the posts around the
time of the United States presidential election of 2004. The
original network consists of 1, 490 nodes and 19, 090 edges.
After deleting nodes with degree less than or equal to 1, we
obtain a network with 1095 nodes and 16, 587 edges. For
this network, we use their labels to partition the network into
two blocks with 508 nodes and 587 nodes, respectively. The
simulation setting is similar to that in Section IV-A1. For this
dataset, we have n = 1095, b = 3, and the average intra-
block edge probability pin = 0.9224, the average inter-block
edge probability pout = 0.0776, ρ1 = 508/1095, ρ2 = 0,
ρ3 = 587/1095, θ = 20. As such, there are two candidates,
i.e., K = b− 1 = 2. Candidate 1 is eager to win the election,
and it already has 508 seeded voters in block 1. On the other
hand, candidate 2 does not have any seeded voters. Undecided
voters only exist in block 3. Suppose that candidate 1 would
like to win over the votes from undecided voters and places
additional ρ3,1 ·n (with ρ3,1 ≤ ρ3 = 587/1095) seeded voters
in block 3. On the other hand, candidate 2 places none of its
seeded voters. As such,
ρub = ρ3 − ρ3,1 =
587
1095
− ρ3,1, (25)
and there are nρub undecided voters in block 3.
The question is then how many seeded voters candidate 1
need to place in block 3 in order to win over almost every
undecided voter. To address such a question, we apply our
percolation result in Theorem 2. Note that in this setting
λ1 =
508
1095
× 0.9224 + 587
1095
× 0.0776 = 0.469525,
λ2 = pout = 0.0776,
λ3 =
587
1095
× 0.469525 + 508
1095
× 0.0776 = 0.530474.
Thus,
3∑
`=1
ρlλl = 0.502198.
For the condition in (12) to hold, we need
pin − β (λb)
2∑b
`=1 ρ`λ`
= 0.9224− β × 0.56034 ≥ 0. (26)
The initial PPV for an undecided voter is set to be h =
(h1, h2) = (0.5, 0.5) as that there is no particular preference
for an undecided voter. Using (13), we can compute
z1 =
508
1095
× 0.0776 + (0.5× ρ3,1 + 587
2190
)× 0.9224
−β × ( 508
1095
× 0.469525× 0.530474 +
(ρ3,1 + (
587
1095
− ρ3,1)× 0.5)× (0.530474)2/0.5),
z2 = (
587
1095
− ρ3,1)× 0.5× 0.9224
−β (
587
1095 − ρ3,1)× 0.5)× (0.530474)2
0.502198
. (27)
In order for z1 ≥ z2, candidate 1 needs to place ρ3,1 seeded
voters in block 3 with
ρ3,1 ≥ 0.23009× β − 0.0361153
1250 − 0.56034× β
. (28)
In Figure 6, we show the fraction of undecided voters who
vote for candidate 1 at T = 106 for β = 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, and
1. The corresponding theoretical percolation thresholds for
ρ3,1 are 0.2358, 0.3123, 0.409, and 0.536, respectively. As
shown in Figure 6, we can also observe the phenomenon
of percolation in this real-world network. However, there are
roughly 5 ∼ 10% errors between the theoretical percolation
thresholds and those estimated from the simulation results in
Figure 6.
2) The Youtube dataset: In this experiment, we evaluate
our model on the Youtube social network in [21]. Youtube
is a video-sharing web site that includes a social network. In
the Youtube social network, if there is a connection between
two users, they are friends. The original network consists of
1, 134, 890 nodes and 2, 987, 624 edges and 8, 385 overlap-
ping communities in this dataset. We first convert overlapping
communities into non-overlapping communities by using the
maximum independent set method in [37]. As there are still
too many communities, we only select the first two or three
largest communities. Nodes with degrees smaller than two
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Fig. 7. Percolation thresholds for the Youtube social network with two blocks
are deleted. Also, self-loop edges are deleted and multiple
edges are replaced by a single edge so that the network is a
simple graph. As a result, we obtain an undirected network
containing two blocks of 798 nodes (resp. three blocks with
900 nodes). The experimental result for two (resp. three)
blocks is shown in Figure 7 (resp. Figure 8). We can also
observe the percolation phenomenon in the Youtube dataset.
3) The email dataset: In this experiment, we evaluate our
model for the email network in [22], [23]. The email network
was generated by using the email data from a large European
research institution. If person u sent person v at least one
email, then there is an edge between them. For this dataset,
there are 1, 005 nodes and 25, 571 edges. For our experiments,
we only select the first three largest groups. Nodes with
degrees smaller than 1 are deleted. Also, self-loop edges are
deleted and multiple edges are replaced by a single edge so
that the network is a simple graph. For this network, we use
their labels to partition the network into three blocks with
52 nodes, 86 nodes, and 96 nodes, respectively. As a result,
we obtain the undirected network containing 230 nodes with
Fig. 8. Percolation thresholds for the Youtube social network with three
blocks
Fig. 9. Percolation thresholds for the email dataset
three blocks. The experimental result for this dataset is shown
in Figure 9. Clearly, we can still observe the percolation
phenomenon.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a new influence propagation
model for modeling the competitive influence of K candidates
among n voters in an election process. In our influence
propagation model, each voter is assigned with an initial K-
dimensional probability preference vector (PPV). The PPV of
a voter is then updated by using the softmax decision based
on the combined influence. For such an influence propagation
model, we showed that for a random network generated
from the stochastic block model, there exists a percolation
threshold for a candidate to win the election if the number of
seeded voters placed by the candidate exceeds the threshold.
By conducting extensive experiments, we also showed that
our theoretical percolation thresholds are very close to those
obtained from simulations for random networks and the errors
are within 10% for the network of Political Blogs. For the
Youtube dataset and the email dataset, our simulation results
also show the percolation phenomenon. Our future work is to
further refine our model by considering more general random
networks, such as the configuration model [38]. In such a
general network model, a candidate can also choose a set of
seeded voters that might depend on the degrees of nodes to
maximize its influence.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Consider an SBM(n, b, pin, pout, ρ) with the n × n adja-
cency matrix A = (au,w) and a node v is in block i. From
the construction of the stochastic block model, we know that
for j 6= i, ∑w∈Bj au,w is a sum of independent Bernoulli
random variables with the parameter pout. We then have from
the strong law of large numbers that
lim
n→∞
∑
w∈Bj au,w
n
= ρjpout, a.s. (29)
Similarity,
lim
n→∞
∑
w∈Bi au,w
n
= ρipin, a.s. (30)
Let kv =
∑n
w=1 au,w be the degree of node v. In view of
(29) and (30), we have
lim
n→∞
kv
n
= ρipin +
∑
j 6=i
ρjpout
= ρipin + (1− ρi)pout, a.s.
= λi, a.s. (31)
where λi is defined in (11). For the ease of our representation,
we represent the limit in (31) by using the following simplified
notation:
kv
n
= λi + o(1). (32)
Note that λi can be viewed as the normalized degree of a
node in block i
Let m be the total number of edges in the random graph
and Bi, i = 1, 2, . . . , b, be the set of nodes in block i. Since
every edge has two ends, it follows that
2m =
n∑
v=1
kv =
b∑
i=1
∑
v∈Bi
kv. (33)
In conjunction with (32), we then have
2m
n2
=
b∑
i=1
ρiλi + o(1). (34)
Recall from (1) that for an undecided voter u in Bub ,
zu,k(t) =
∑
w 6=u
q(w, u)hw,k(t)
=
b−1∑
i=1
∑
w∈Bi
q(w, u)hw,k(t) +
∑
w 6=u,w∈Bb
q(w, u)hw,k(t)
=
∑
w∈Bk
q(w, u) +
∑
w 6=u,w∈Bb
q(w, u)hw,k(t), (35)
where we use hw,k(t) = δi,k for w ∈ Bi in the last identity.
For the generalized modularity in (5), we have∑
w∈Bk
q(w, u) =
∑
w∈Bk
(au,w
2m
− β kw
2m
ku
2m
)
. (36)
Using (29), (32) and (34) in (36) yields
n
∑
w∈Bk
q(w, u) =
(∑
w∈Bk au,w
n
)
(
n2
2m
)
−β 1
n
∑
w∈Bk
(
kw
n
)(
n2
2m
)(
ku
n
)(
n2
2m
)
=
ρk∑b
`=1 ρ`λ`
(
pout − β λkλb∑b
`=1 ρ`λ`
)
+ o(1). (37)
Similarly, we can further decompose the second sum in (35)
as follows:∑
w 6=u,w∈Bb
q(w, u)hw,k(t)
=
b−1∑
i=1
∑
w∈Bb,i
q(w, u)hw,k(t) +
∑
w 6=u,w∈Bub
q(w, u)hw,k(t)
=
∑
w∈Bb,k
q(w, u) +
∑
w 6=u,w∈Bub
q(w, u)hw,k(t). (38)
Using (30), (32) and (34), we have
n
∑
w∈Bb,k
q(w, u) =
(∑
w∈Bb,k au,w
n
)
(
n2
2m
)
−β 1
n
∑
w∈Bb,k
(
kw
n
)(
n2
2m
)(
ku
n
)(
n2
2m
)
=
ρb,k∑b
`=1 ρ`λ`
(
pin − β (λb)
2∑b
`=1 ρ`λ`
)
+ o(1). (39)
Similarly,
n
∑
w 6=u,w∈Bub
q(w, u)hw,k(t)
=
(∑
w 6=u,w∈Bub au,whw,k(t)
n
)
(
n2
2m
)
−β 1
n
∑
w 6=u,w∈Bub
hw,k(t)(
kw
n
)(
n2
2m
)(
ku
n
)(
n2
2m
) + o(1).
(40)
Since {au,w, w ∈ Bub } are independent Bernoulli random
variables with mean pin, we use the mean field approximation
to approximate the weighted sum of independent random
variables
∑
w 6=u,w∈Bub au,whw,k(t)/n by its mean as follows:∑
w 6=u,w∈Bub au,whw,k(t)
n
≈
∑
w 6=u,w∈Bub pinhw,k(t)
n
= ρub pinhk(t) + o(1). (41)
Using (41), (32) and (34) in (40) yields
n
∑
w 6=u,w∈Bub
q(w, u)hw,k(t)
≈ ρ
u
bhk(t)∑b
`=1 ρ`λ`
(
pin − β (λb)
2∑b
`=1 ρ`λ`
)
. (42)
Using (37), (39), and (42) in (35) yields (10).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We prove Theorem 2 by induction on t. For t = 0, the
inequality in (14) holds trivially at t = 0 as hu,k(0) = 1/(b−
1) for all k. Also, we have from (10) in Lemma 1 and (13)
that zu,k∗(0) ≥ zu,k(0) for all k 6= k∗ and the inequality in
(15) also holds at time 0.
Now suppose that there is a clock tick of the undecided
voter u at time t. Then the PPV of voter u is updated according
to (2). This implies that
hu,k∗(t
+)
hu,k(t+)
=
eθzu,k∗ (t)hu,k∗(t)
eθzu,k(t)hu,k(t)
= eθ(zu,k∗ (t)−zu,k(t))
hu,k∗(t)
hu,k(t)
. (43)
Since zu,k∗(t) ≥ zu,k(t) (from the induction hypothesis in
(15)) and θ ≥ 0, we have
hu,k∗(t
+)
hu,k(t+)
≥ hu,k∗(t)
hu,k(t)
. (44)
In conjunction with the induction hypothesis in (14), i.e.,
hu,k∗(t) ≥ hu,k(t), it then follows that hu,k∗(t+) ≥ hu,k(t+).
To show that the induction hypothesis in (16) holds, we
rewrite(44) as follows:
hu,k∗(t
+)hu,k(t) ≥ hu,k∗(t)hu,k(t+). (45)
Since PPVs are probability distributions, summing over k on
both sides of (45) yields
hu,k∗(t
+) ≥ hu,k∗(t). (46)
It remains to show that the induction hypothesis
zv,k∗(t
+) ≥ zv,k(t+) in (15) for every undecided voter v
after the update of the PPV of voter u at time t. Using the
mean field approximation in (10) yields
n
(
zv,k∗(t
+)− zv,k(t+)− (zv,k∗(t)− zv,k(t))
)
≈ ρ
u
b∑b
`=1 ρ`λ`
(
pin − β (λb)
2∑b
`=1 ρ`λ`
)
(
hk∗(t
+)− hk(t+)− hk∗(t) + hk(t)
)
. (47)
Since only the PPV of voter u is updated at time t, we have
from (9) and the update rule in (2) that
hk∗(t
+)− hk(t+)− hk∗(t) + hk(t)
=
1
nρub
(
hu,k∗(t
+)− hu,k(t+)− hu,k∗(t) + hu,k(t)
)
=
1
nρub
(
(ceθzu,k∗ (t) − 1)hu,k∗(t)
−(ceθzu,k(t) − 1)hu,k(t)
)
, (48)
where c = 1/
∑b−1
`=1 e
θzu,`(t)hu,`(t) is the normalization
constant. Now we show that
(ceθzu,k∗ (t) − 1)hu,k∗(t)− (ceθzu,k(t) − 1)hu,k(t) ≥ 0. (49)
Since we have shown in (46) that hu,k∗(t+) ≥ hu,k∗(t), we
know that ceθzu,k∗ (t) − 1 ≥ 0. If ceθzu,k(t) − 1 < 0, then
the inequality in (49) holds trivially. On the other hand, if
ceθzu,k(t)−1 ≥ 0, then we have from the induction hypotheses
zu,k∗(t) ≥ zu,k(t) and hu,k∗(t) ≥ hu,k(t) that the inequality
in (49) also holds. Thus,
hk∗(t
+)− hk(t+)− hk∗(t) + hk(t) ≥ 0. (50)
Using (50) and (12) in (47) yields
zv,k∗(t
+)− zv,k(t+)− (zv,k∗(t)− zv,k(t)) ≥ 0. (51)
From the induction hypothesis zv,k∗(t) ≥ zv,k(t), we then
have zv,k∗(t+) ≥ zv,k(t+). This then concludes the proofs
for all the three induction hypotheses.
